Contracting and Reporting Conservatism around a Change in Fiduciary Duties*

We exploit an influential 1991 Delaware court ruling to examine simultaneously two types of conservatism that play important roles in resolving creditor–owner agency conflicts: contracting conservatism and reporting conservatism. The ruling expanded managerial fiduciary duties in favor of creditors for Delaware-incorporated firms in the vicinity of insolvency. In those firms, following the ruling, debt contracts are less likely to include conservative adjustments to accounting numbers used for covenant compliance (i.e., contracting conservatism decreases), while public financial reporting becomes more conservative (i.e., reporting conservatism increases). The decrease in contracting conservatism is concentrated in firms that exhibit a greater increase in reporting conservatism, suggesting that reporting conservatism is more cost-effective in resolving agency conflicts. In addition, the substitution effect is more pronounced in firms facing greater business uncertainty and firms with greater board independence.     

结构性去杠杆下的中国宏观经济*——2018年中期中国宏观经济分析与预测

2018年以来中国经济平稳运行，物价水平稳定，就业形势整体向好，经济增长质量稳步提升。不过，当前中国经济仍然面临一定的下行压力，尤其需要警惕消费增速过快下滑、宏观税负进一步加重、民间投资复苏乏力、部分企业效益状况显著恶化、去杠杆过程中金融体系不稳定性加剧等主要风险点。此外，杠杆率高企是现阶段中国经济面临的突出问题，而且中国的杠杆率在不同部门之间以及各部门内部均体现出明显的结构性特点。为此，中央在2018年专门提出了“结构性去杠杆”的新思路。在“结构性去杠杆”稳步推进的大背景下，宏观政策既要积极应对经济下行压力，谨防去杠杆带来的经济增速超预期下滑风险，又要激发经济内生增长动力，促使经济实现长期可持续发展和“高质量发展”。     

Financial crises,debt overhang,and firm growth in transition economies

ABSTRACT

We examine the effects of the global financial crisis of 2008 and the European debt crisis of 2011 on the relationship between capital structure, investments, and performance for Eastern European companies. While the existing literature documents how firms’ investments are sensitive to the availability of internal funds and to debt holdings, we further investigate whether this investment sensitivity also translates in different levels of performance, and document that capital structure indeed has both a direct and an indirect effect, mediated by the capital expenditure channel. We show that firms with higher financial flexibility experience higher investments and returns on capital. Over-levered firms instead suffer from a debt overhang condition, forcing them to curb investments, and consequently experiencing lower performance. Overall, we provide evidence on the importance of capital structure and financial flexibility on investments and performance, showing the real consequences of the debt overhang condition on firm value creation. Firms should therefore aim at maintaining adequate financial flexibility in order to be able to pursue future profitable investment opportunities, and avoid the under-investment problem arising from a debt overhang situation.     

Policy Dimensions of Progressive Institutional Change: Lessons from China’s Construction of a Socialist Market Economy

Abstract:

Through a comprehensive review of the progressive institutional change (PIC) literature, I first discuss four possible trajectories of PIC by considering the forces of societal reaction that might frame the path, as well as the scale and scope of the changes. Thus, I pose four questions that need to be asked when related policies are formulated for PIC. To illustrate this method, I scrutinize the evidence from the construction of a socialist market economy by the Chinese government since the 1980s and argue that related policies have successfully promoted PIC from three dimensions: (1) curbing potential conflicts with power groups; (2) promoting a sense of awareness among stakeholders; and (3) minimizing disturbances to the community. Actually, the related changes demonstrate a dynamic “displacement process” for PICs. Despite the success of this sociosystem, it is found that the sustaining of PIC which requires policy factors that enhance instrumental efficiency in the Chinese context will serve as a challenge to the Chinese government ahead.     

Financial Insecurity in a World of Plenty

Abstract

The U.S. economy is addicted to the simulative impacts of household borrowing. Household debt has grown dramatically since the 1990s and has served to mitigate the detrimental effects of stagnant household wages. The accumulation of this debt has also had the macroeconomic impact of stimulating the economy, pushing it closer towards full employment. However does full employment stimulated by household indebtedness actually represent economic progress? It is argued that even the poorest citizen in a modern industrialized society is better off than a king of feudal Europe, yet in the United States such material prosperity is often tied to social insecurity thanks to debt. The growth of this debt has been enabled by a financial system that has evolved dramatically over the past forty years. The U.S. financial system’s primary role is no longer to finance investment but is rather a tool that enables a separation of ownership from use. Debt has fueled corporate profits which have enriched the shareholding class while at the same time the system has reduced the financial security of the majority of workers. This article crystalizes these issues by analyzing the differentials in financial circumstances faced by workers and shareholders in several major U.S. firms.     

Reelection,growth and public debt

In this work we examine how economic growth affects public debt when interacted with reelection prospects. Reelection considerations shorten political time horizons and give rise to political myopia that exacerbates debt accumulation. That laxer institutional reelection restrictions (e.g., no term limits) mitigate this effect due to electoral accountability is well known. Incorporating growth, we find that this mitigation can be reversed because less myopic, and more accountable, incumbents put more emphasis on smoothing the effects of growth across generations. We test these predictions using an annual-based panel of U.S. states over the period 1963–2010. Our identification strategy rests on constitutionally-entrenched differences in gubernatorial term limits that provide plausibly exogenous variation in reelection prospects, and aggregate national TFP shocks that are exogenous to individual states. Our estimates indicate that when reelection is possible a one standard deviation positive income shock induces, within the same year, a relative increase of approximately $40 in real per capita public debt.     

Insolvency regimes and firms' default risk under economic uncertainty and shocks

One of the arguments often advanced for implementing a stronger insolvency and bankruptcy framework is that it enhances credit discipline among firms. Using a large cross-country firm-level dataset, we empirically test whether a stronger insolvency regime reduces firms' likelihood of defaulting on their debt. In particular, we examine whether it reduces default risk during increased economic uncertainty and various external shocks. Our results confirm that a stronger insolvency regime moderates the adverse effects of economic shocks on firms' default risk. The effects are more pronounced for firms in the top half of the size distribution. We also explore channels through which improved creditor rights influence firms' default risk, including dependence on external finance, corporate leverage, and managerial ethics. Our main results are robust to an alternative measure of default risk, inclusion of currency and sovereign debt crisis episodes, and alternative estimations.     

Profit shifting and tax-rate uncertainty

Using firm-level data for 1,084 parent firms in 24 countries and for 9,497 subsidiaries in 54 countries, we show that tax-motivated profit shifting is larger among subsidiaries in countries that have stable corporate tax rates over time. Our findings further suggest that firms move away from transfer pricing and toward intragroup debt shifting that has lower adjustment costs. Our results are robust to several identification methods and respecifications, and they highlight the important role of tax-rate uncertainty in the profit-shifting decision while pointing to an adjustment away from more costly transfer pricing and toward debt shifting.     

Government contracts and US bond yield spreads: A study on costs and benefits of materialized political connections

In a 1991–2013 sample of bonds issued by US public firms, we find that the cost of debt (yield spread relative to comparable Treasuries) of suppliers to government agencies is contingent on the strategic importance of the supplier's industry. The yield spreads for strategically unimportant government suppliers are higher than for firms that are not government suppliers. If government contracts serve as tangible evidence of political connections, these higher yield spreads indicate that weaker corporate governance as a cost of political connections outweighs the benefits of said connections. For the subsample of government suppliers from strategically important industries, where the benefits of implicit bailout guarantees and revenue stability outweigh the corporate governance problems, the cost of debt is lower than for firms that are not government suppliers. The higher (lower) cost of debt for strategically unimportant (strategically important) suppliers is confined to contracting with the federal government. Our findings are robust to alternative variable and sample specifications, and to endogeneity concerns.     

Politically connected boards,family and business group affiliations,and cost of capital: Evidence from Indonesia

We investigate the effect of politically connected boards (both supervisory boards [SBs] and boards of directors [BODs]) on cost of debt and equity capital of listed companies in Indonesia which has established a two-tier corporate governance system. The results, based on 250 firms, suggest that companies with politically connected SBs experience lower cost of debt and equity capital, whereas politically connected BODs have no association with cost of either debt or equity. Furthermore, we find that family firms and firms belonging to business groups with politically connected SBs enjoy lower cost of debt and equity capital. Our main results are robust to alternative measures and to tests for endogeneity.